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his State of the Union address in January, 1998, Presi?
In dent Clinton won thunderous applause for threatening to
force Iraq "to comply with the UNSCOM regime and the will
of the United Nations." Stopping UN chemical and biological
weapons inspectors from"completing their mission," declared
the President, defies "the will of the world." In the next three
weeks, the White House ordered a massive show of force in
the Gulf. Even traditional hawks, however, realized that a
bombing mission could undermine American hegemonic in?
terests in the Gulf that are served by a continuation of the
sanctions regime.
For seven years, the Bush/Thatcher-Clinton/Blair policy has
been to continue the Gulf war through a sanctions regime
with five components, three ofthem multilateral and two uni?
lateral: a weapons embargo; a civilian trade embargo, modi?
fied under the "oil for food" provisions; ongoing inspections,
monitoring and surveillance of Iraqi military facilities by in?
ternational civil servants; "no-flyzones" patrolled by US forces;
and periodic punitive air strikes. This regime serves at least
three major, long-standing US interests in the Gulf.
The success of the United Nations Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM) in coercive arms control is unprecedented,
with systematic destruction of more Iraqi weapons than fire?
power destroyed in Desert Storm. With virtually its entire con?
ventional offensive arsenal dismantled, there is now reason to
suspect that Iraq has developed lethal biological and chemi?
cal weapons capacities that are threatening precisely because
they can be produced in small factories. Continued inspec?
tions, video surveillance, mandatory reports and monitoring
of facilities by international experts constitute the best pos?
sible guarantee that Saddam Hussein's military will not de?
velop and deploy nerve gas or germ warfare. The US also
independently scrutinizes Iraqi military movements using spy
planes and post-radar technology.
Since the discovery of the Gulf region's oil riches, Britain
and America have sought to dominate the strategic waterway
and its coastlines, always looking forpermanent military and
naval facilities. With the cold war over, this is now the most
important deployment in the world, the centerpiece of Penta?
gon strategizing, budgets and procurement. If Iraq were found
to be in compliance with United Nations Security Council
other words, if it could show that
Resolution 687 (SC687)?in
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it has dismantled its offensive weapons capabilities, including
its chemical and biological weapons systems?many of the
roughly 18,000 US troops who stay busy policing the "no fly
zone" would be redeployed. Base and pre-positioning rights,
especially in SaudiArabia, might have to be renegotiated. As
long as sanctions remain in place, however, the US and its ally
Britain are positioned to control Persian Gulf exports to the
rest of the world.
In addition, despite the protection of trade embargoes
against several major oil-exporting nations, petroleum prices
are falling. Precipitous sale of Iraqi oil could glut an alreadysaturated market, benefiting Baghdad at the expense of two
important sets of oil-exporters: the rich Arab potentates of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), now under US mili?
tary protection; and other, more populous petroleum produc?
ing nations whose sales barely cover interest on their foreign
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debts, most notably Mexico and Indonesia. For Indonesia
alone, teetering on the brink of default, even a modest dip in
the world price for its primary export could spell disaster.
Already the Suharto dictatorship, never censured by the US
government for its rapacious annexation of East Timor, has
had to cancel aircraft purchases from the US and imposed
austerity on its people. Amidst volatility in global stock mar?
kets, instability in energy prices could send shivers through?
out the fuel, defense and banking industries. The Wall Street
Journal, among others, has reported the privileged position
of French, Italian, Russian and Malaysian oil companies,
ready to take advantage of any loosening of oil sanctions, to
the detriment of US oil giants. While Moscow and Paris hope
to profit from an opening of the Iraqi market, American al?
lies and businesses favor tightly-controlled sales ofBaghdad's
petroleum.
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Even after the Security Council passed a resolution as?
serting its intention to retain decision-making power in re?
sponding to any Iraqi breach, the Clinton foreign policy team
declared that earlier resolutions already authorized a mili?
tary response to infractions of what Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright began calling an "inspections regime."
In fact, this was nothing like 1993 when US warplanes uni?
laterally retaliated against Iraqi military incursions into
Kurdish "safe havens" under the controversial, but recogniz?
able, doctrine of "humanitarian intervention." This time, af?
ter Iraq failed to admit American inspectors to sensitive sites,
the White House claimed a mandate under the November
1990 SC678, the Gulfwar resolution, to punish whatAlbright
deemed a"material breach" of the April 1991SC687, which
imposed sanctions, and SC718, which created the UN Spe?
cial Commission.
This spurious legalistic argument ran afoul of issues that
had bedeviled the UNSCOM regime all along. First, although
SC686, which brought a provisional end to the hostilities, does
expressly reserve the authorization to use "all necessary
means" to force compliance with subsequent resolutions, it
also leaves judgment on these matters to the Security Coun?
cil, not individual states. Second, although none of the four
UN resolutions spells out the precise conditions that Iraq must
meet before sanctions are lifted,the American assertion that
punishment must continue as long as Saddam Hussein rules
Iraq is legally untenable. Most experts agree that once in?
spectors certifyan end to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
program, sanctions end. Already in October 1997, Russia and
France proposed easing the trade embargo in light of the sig?
nificant reduction in Iraq's nuclear and missile arsenal uncTer
UNSCOM supervision. The US and the UK resisted, insist?
ing that their inspectors could ferret out suspected secret
chemical and biological laboratories. This touched on the UN's
sensitivity about neutrality and the multi-nationality of
UNSCOM inspections teams, which, while nominated by their
governments, are supposed to be drawn from as many coun?
tries and regions as possible, with particular care to avoid
staffingwith experts from"intelligence-providingstates."These
issues made it possible for the Iraqi dictator to complain that
of the UNSCOM
positions
through their domination
Anglos and Americans were moving the goal posts, deliber?
ately prolonging the inspections and providing intelligence
directly to governments that were planning to attack the very
sites to which access was demanded.
The arsenal assembled for this exercise in gunboat diplo?
macy displayed the latest weapons, some of them designed
specifically for the Iraqi arena: titanium-tipped cruise mis?
siles, bunker-penetrating and satellite-guided bombs, and the
Sensor Fused Weapon that carries multiple "skeet"
submunitions each with target-seeking heat sensors. In Feb?
ruary,28,000 men and women were deployed to the Gulf. The
Pentagon had ready detailed plans for penetrating under?
ground installations, detonating presidential compounds and
neutralizing the Iraqi Republican Guard. Within the militaryindustrial establishment, from the perspective of troop mo?
rale in a post-Somalia era and from commercial media outlets
Middle East Report ? Spring 1998

that love to hate Saddam, there is a certain imperative to use
the expensive new weapons. The deployment alone cost an
estimated $100 million per day.
Bombing on this pretext, however, would be like using dy?
namite to find the needle in a haystack. Before an attack on
the scale threatened could commence, all UNSCOM weapons
inspection teams (currently carrying out 95 percent of their
inspections) would have to evacuate and monitoring would
cease. Humanitarian missions and the "oil-for-food"program
would also be suspended. Furthermore, because the Security
Council is not prepared to back military action, the multilat?
eral elements ofthe sanctions regime would be dismantled. In
addition, Iraq's neighbors' refusal to allow air strikes to be
launched from their soil could create political as well as logis?
tical problems. Most importantly, destruction of Iraq's mili?
tary and social infrastructure would almost certainly bring
chaos and further suffering that could easily engage US and

perhaps British, Canadian or European soldiers in a massive
humanitarian undertaking.
At home, there is a strand of public opinion that favors
bombing Iraq on principle, because its ruler is so bad that, like
the figures hunted down by Clint Eastwood or Arnold
Schwartzenegger, he needs to killed. But the foreign policy
team's sales pitch was booed not only byVietnam-vintage heck?
lers but also American bishops, already on record in favor of
expanding oil sales to meet the humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people. Similarly, a wide range of public opinion, from
left to right, questions the utility of a bombing campaign.
For all these reasons, UN secretary General Kofi Annan's
diplomatic success was not incompatible with US interests
in the Gulf. Unlike the 1990/91 resolutions, the new "deal"
contains specific language expanding the scope ofinspections
and enforcing compliance. Despite other Security Council
members' protestations, in the event of a future transgres?
sion, Washington will claim clear authorization for punish?
ment under the new resolution. In the meantime, Iraqi oil
sales will be regulated, even as the food-for-oilallowances
are expanded. Gunboats and aircraft carriers will remain in
a state of readiness for action. A potentially deep rift in the
Gulf war coalition remains, but its consequences are averted,
and existing basing rights maintained. The status quo of in?
ternationally mandated US military hegemony in the Gulf
remains largely intact.
Students ofinternational relations call this sort of arrange?
ment a hegemonic regime, wherein imperialist powers del?
egate certain tasks to multilateral organizations. The IMF,
forinstance, imposes conditions on debtor nations that would
be difficultfor creditors to impose unilaterally. If US soldiers
were doing the work of UNSCOM, they would be an army of
occupation. Without UNSCOM, the US presence in the Gulf
would be acknowledged as offensive,not acceded to as defen?
sive. Although US has often flaunted international law and
its mechanisms?for
instance, in mining Nicaraguan har?
bors, violating Security Council resolutions affecting Israel,

refusing to pay UN dues?in this particular instance the mul?
tilateral features of the sanctions regime go hand-in-glove
with imperialist ambitions. While some in Congress claim
the Pentagon is doing the UN's bidding, elsewhere many
people think just the opposite.
Real long-term US interests, however, do favor the genu?
ine autonomy and integrity of the UN's arms control regime
in Iraq. A farsighted policy would project monitoring ofweap?
ons of mass destruction to the Middle East region as a whole
even beyond the Iraq sanctions regime. There is little evi?
dence of this in Washington, where discussion focuses on the
personality of Saddam Hussein and a well-worn litany of his
sins, thus reducing the question to "what shall we do about
this evil madman" rather than "how can we prevent weap?
ons proliferation?" For all the talk about"taking out Saddam,"
one wonders where American policy in the Gulf would be
without him.
The status quo is not sustainable indefinitely. The stan?
dard television image of 'the Gul?" of US oil rigs and aircraft
carriers glittering over flat sand and water, is something of a
mirage. Current American policy still clings to the now-out?
moded notion of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. Even
after a thaw in relations with Tehran, however, all
Washington's eggs are in the fragile GCC basket. The rela?
tionship of the US to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the
other kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula is not one of classi?
cal metropolitan-client relations. The Arab Gulf states are
paying customers who set strict limits on foreigners in their
countries. One of the ironies of the recent crisis is that inter?
national television reporters enjoy greater access to Baghdad
than to Riyadh. The Gulf monarchies' survival may be in?
versely related to their loyalty to US military aspirations in
their region. The uncertain futures of all the Arab govern?
ments of the Gulf region, as well as the huge stockpile of
weapons in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, should pro?
vide strong incentive for prudent policymakers to empower
?
an autonomous weapons inspections apparatus.
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